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Abstract—As of 2016 the HIV/AIDS epidemics is still a key
public health problem. Recent reports showed that alarmingly
high numbers of people in vulnerable populations are not
reached by preventative efforts. Despite technology improve-
ment, we are not yet able to identify populations that are most
susceptible to HIV infections. In order to enable evidence-
based prevention, we are studying new methods to identify
HIV at-risk populations, exploiting Twitter posts as possible
indicators of HIV risk. Our research on social network analysis
and machine learning outlined the feasibility of using tweets
as monitoring tool for HIV-related risk at the demographic,
geographical, and social network level. However, this approach
highlights ethical dilemmas in three different areas: data collec-
tion and analysis, risk inference through imperfect probabilistic
approaches, and data-driven prevention. We contribute a de-
scription, analysis and discussion of ethics based on our 2-year
experience with clinicians, IRBs, and local HIV communities
in San Diego, California.
Keywords- Twitter, HIV/AIDS, Social Media, Digital Epi-
demiology, Ethics
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
HIV remains a significant public health problem as indi-
cated by the numbers of new HIV infections, particularly in
vulnerable populations such as Men who have Sex with Men
(MSM). In the USA, recent reports show a general increase
of 8% between 2001—2012 and 22% increase among young
(13–24 yr old) gay and bisexual men, which in turn represent
72% of all new infections in that age group [1]. Similarly,
the incidence of HIV in MSM in the United Kingdom
has increased between 1990 and 2010 with an estimated
mean incidence of 0.30/100 person-years between 1990–
1997 and 0.45/100 person years between 1998–2010 [2].
The generalized approach to HIV prevention has focused on
universal HIV screening [3], though the proportion of adults
in the U.S. who have “ever tested” remains below 50%. In
general, efforts to focus prevention messages and resources
to those at greatest risk of acquiring infection are lacking.
On the other side, mapping the social and sexual network
dynamics of MSM at greatest risk of acquiring HIV, and
associating these networks with available, well-characterized
sexual network characteristics of HIV-infected transmission
networks may provide opportunities to evaluate novel tar-
geted approaches to HIV prevention interventions. Specifi-
cally, use of molecular epidemiological methods have greatly
increased our understanding of HIV transmission dynamics.
By making use of the HIV sequence data derived from
routine (standard of care) HIV drug resistance testing, it is
possible to infer a partial transmission network. For instance,
these data have been used to extensively characterize the San
Diego Primary Infection Cohort (SD PIC) HIV transmission
network and identify the network features of persons at
greatest risk for HIV transmission within their first year
following incident infection [4]. Simulations of these data
also demonstrate that targeted antiretroviral therapy (ART)
to those with the highest overall risk of transmission (based
on an objectively derived “transmission network score”)
resulted in a significantly greater reduction in HIV network
transmission as compared to random ART [4]. However,
while early and universal ART in HIV infected persons is the
cornerstone of effective HIV prevention, these methods do
not address the HIV acquisition risk among HIV-uninfected
persons in the same sexual network.
Just as HIV transmission networks are used to identify
high-yield prevention targets for ART interventions, we
believe that social network data derived from social media
may be used to characterize the at-risk social network
structure, and may help to identify those at greatest risk
for acquiring HIV infection. Among current social media
platforms, Twitter – a highly trafficked social media network
built on tweets and followers used around the world –
is particularly interesting. It is used not only to connect
with friends/acquaintances online but also to follow real-
time events (such as the Arab Spring [5], or the extent
of an earthquake [6]) and other information users find
interesting. The potential to use Twitter as real-time HIV
monitoring method was explored by Young and colleagues at
UCLA who showed a relationship of tweets containing drug
and sex related words, with HIV prevalence data reported
by the US Center for Diseases Control (CDC) [7], [8].
These data demonstrated a significant correlation between
higher numbers of HIV-risk communications and higher HIV
prevalence within the county. This suggests that HIV-risk
behavior that is shared by Twitter users online via tweets
to their followers may be used to infer regional network
characteristics of HIV risk.
This initial work shows the incredible potential of linking
social media with HIV-risk behavior and potentially use
Twitter data as a real-time tool to characterize and monitor
HIV-at risk social networks. Particularly compelling is the
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opportunity that publicly available tweets offer, as a way to
unobtrusively collect and analyze this data, identify potential
at-risk individuals and isolate their social networks, and then
intervene with appropriate preventative efforts, either at the
individual or at the community level. This approach presents
the opportunity to open up avenues on one of two fronts:
(i) linkage to care and free HIV testing advertisements,
and (ii) identification of new groups (geographic, socio-
demographic, etc.) that can be reached to implement targeted
prevention campaigns. However, what initially seems like a
moderately complex big data research program, with clear
applicability into the real world, turns out to entice a number
of critical ethical questions, in particular in relationship with
the vulnerable HIV/AIDS populations, possible issues with
stigma, as well as general Digital and Social Media (DSM)
analysis and inferences.
The contribution of this paper is to introduce the ethical
issues that emerged from the development and deployment
of our PIRC-Net infrastructure [9] aimed to infer HIV risk
from publicly available tweets, and then critically discuss
those issues in terms of three specific point of views: data
collection and analysis, modeling and risk inference, and
preventative efforts. In the remainder of this paper we will
first introduce our PIRC-Net infrastructure, including our
data collection and analysis strategies. We will then highlight
opportunities for prevention efforts based on the data that our
research is generating. Finally we will move into a critical
discussion of the ethical dimension of our research across
the three areas outlined above.
II. THE PIRC-NET INFRASTRUCTURE
HIV’s primary route of transmission is governed by
connections within social or sexual networks, therefore ana-
lyzing such networks can inform public health measures to
contain the spread of HIV. However, these networks tend to
have a dynamic structure, typically becoming apparent only
after the long incubation period between HIV transmission
and disease state. Moreover, due to HIV’s low transmis-
sion rate per contact, infections typically only involve sub-
sections of a social network. Traditional methods of defining
network features through interviews and partner-tracing are
not proving as effective [4]. On the other side, given how
people’s social media footprint mirrors their real life to a
large extent [10], [11], real-time analysis of social networks
could help build an infection surveillance radar of HIV
transmission risk behavior. Twitter data have the potential
to equip us with location and population based HIV risk
behavior indicators to infer transmission networks which
could help provide an early warning indicator for HIV
risk [12]. Research leading to characterize the relationship
between users who tweet about high-risk behavior and derive
social and sexual networks has the potential to produce
major impact on a broad set of medical and behavioral
research, and open up a new exciting wave of possibilities.
In order to exploit this exciting space, we built PIRC-
Net a computational infrastructure aimed at collecting data
from Twitter, filter this data for possible risk of HIV, and
then identify relevant features at the social network level
to enable better characterization of at-risk networks [9].
PIRC-Net’s goal is to enable initial exploratory analysis of
the emerging social structures to unravel the relationships
between different HIV risk behaviors. Various dimensions
of this data such as geography, demographics, and social
groups have been used in PIRC-Net to model HIV risk.
A. Data Collection
Twitter provides an Application Programming Interface1
(API) to programmatically access users’ data. Along with
the standard APIs, Twitter provides a Streaming API that
creates a long-standing connection between the client and the
server, and streams the incoming tweets to the subscribing
clients. In order to capture tweets from San Diego alone, we
used Twitter’s Filter Hose API which allowed us to collect
geo-tagged tweets that are generated within our San Diego
geocoded bounding box in real-time.
The tweets collected using the Streaming API are con-
tinuously pushed onto a MongoDB2 database that stores
them and enables easy access for analysis. MongoDB was
used mainly owing to the ease of storing semi-structured
documents, high write throughput, and support for native
map-reduce queries for performing on-demand aggregations.
To identify HIV tweets that indicate risk behavior, all
tweets from San Diego County are filtered to create a
smaller corpus of tweets based on the presence of certain
HIV transmission “risk words” in their tweet content. A
risk word is essentially a term considered to be positively
correlated with HIV risk behavior. A small group of clinical
collaborators –faculty and trainees working in the field– with
daily experience in the setting of prevention and treatment,
as well as outreach in the community acted as domain
experts and helped us to define five broad categories of
HIV risk words. These buckets were populated with words
frequently used in the local San Diego community.
1) Substance Abuse Bucket
E.g. meth, ice, snow, cocaine, party&play
2) Sex Bucket
E.g. creampie, cottaging, bronco, party&play
3) Sex Venues Bucket
E.g. loft, redwing, bourbon street
4) MSM Sexual Behaviors Bucket
E.g. homo, gay, queen
5) Sexually Transmitted Infection Bucket
E.g. syfy, drip, gleet
Data collection is followed by data filtering to eliminate
false positives, and then pulling from Twitter all related users
1http://dev.twitter.com
2http://www.mongodb.com
2
1776
who either re-tweeted a tweet or were mentioned in one.
These data are stored on a separate MongoDB collection. In
this initial filtering phase, it was important to understand the
context in which the keywords are used to determine the at-
risk nature of the tweet. For example, a tweet such as “I love
ice coffee” could be miscategorized due to the presence of
the keyword ice. Our filtering algorithms discard such false
positives to ensure better signal-to-noise ratio. We discuss
this in detail in the next subsection.
B. Data Cleaning
The data collection process filters the data based on the
presence of keywords from the five HIV risk categories.
However, on a microblogging social network like Twitter,
the text is limited to 140 characters. This leads to the use
of a lot of text shortening, abbreviation, and emoticons.
Additionally, even though our data collection process fil-
tered the incoming tweets based on the presence of certain
risk keywords, these risk words could mean something
entirely different in different contexts, and hence at times
be misfiltered as at-risk. In order to filter out such false
positives, we defined inclusion and exclusion lists based on
the co-occurrence of words with these risk keywords. For
instance, the exclusion list for the keyword “crack” (slang
for meth/drug) would include crack me up, crack myself up,
crack up, crack open, crack of dawn. A tweet with a phrase
that reads “crack me up” would pass our first crude filter for
tweets tagged with risk words based merely on the presence
of certain predefined keywords. However, the second level
filter based on inclusion/exclusion lists would discard such
false positives based on the co-occurrence of words. The
inclusion list on the other hand would include words that if
co-occurred with the keywords under consideration would
allow the tweets to pass through this second level of filtering.
This data cleaning phase led to the reduction of tweets
that passed the initial keyword filter based by 60%, thus im-
proving the signal in the data. While the two-stage filtering
process significantly brings down the number of irrelevant
tweets that are considered at risk, a fairly large number
of false positives still remain in the corpus. To understand
the veracity of the filtering process, a domain expert on
our team manually assigned “Positive Risk” and “Negative
Risk” labels to a subset of our corpus of already filtered
Tweets. We observed that the final manually labeled data
comprised of 27% true positives (positive risk) and 72% of
false positives (negative risk) with respect to our filtering
approach, indicating still a very high number of wrongly
classified tweets, mostly due to tweets that did not follow
our inclusion/exclusion criteria list.
C. Machine Learning Filtering
This initial analysis was performed on a randomly selected
small corpus of our data, and we assumed that the rest of the
data would show similar behavior in the context of false vs.
true positives. Given the large size of the corpus we decided
to use a Machine Learning (ML) approach to build a better
filter. We recruited 30 domain experts from our local HIV
at risk community who manually labeled a larger amount of
tweets on a 4-point scale (high-risk, risk, low-risk, no-risk)
or an additional “I do not understand”. As expected, the
majority of our tweets was classified as not showing any
risk behavior. We used this data to train a classifier using
a variety of algorithms, and then test the results against
the labeled data. While it is outside of the scope of this
paper to discuss our ML approach in detail, applying a
Multinomial Bayes approach [13] that looked at consecutive
word (unigrams, bigrams and trigrams) in combination with
our risk words, brought the true-positive/false-positive ratio
from 3/8 to 17/1, resulting in a 45 times better accuracy.
D. PIRC-Net Social Network Analysis
In addition to the raw analysis of the textual at-risk
features of tweets, we decided to capture user connections
within the social network to provide additional signal for
HIV risk analysis. The user-tweet and user-user connections
were modeled in a graph in the form of nodes and rela-
tionships with the help of Twitter’s APIs accessing publicly
available data. In order to store this network based data we
built a Twitter network model and used the Neo4J database
management system.3 Our network model was based on
seven different concepts:
1) USER, Twitter users at HIV risk based on their tweets.
2) TWEET, HIV tweet containing risk words in Twitter.
3) HASHTAG, Hashtag used in the tweet tagged with
HIV risk words.
4) URL, URL being referred to in the tweet containing
risk words.
5) FOLLOWER USER, Set of users that follow each
of the at risk users (So FOLLOWER USER may or
may not be an HIV risk Twitter user).
6) ONTOLOGY BUCKET, The five risk buckets we
defined above.
7) ONTOLOGY INSTANCE, HIV risk word in each
HIV risk bucket.
Each of these concepts are considered nodes in our
network model and are connected via edges to each other.
We defined nine different types of edges:
1) TWEETED, USER to TWEET: author of the tweet.
2) IS REPLY FOR, TWEET to TWEET: reply to an-
other tweet.
3) RETWEET OF, TWEET to TWEET: retweet of
another tweet.
4) FOLLOWS, USER to USER: following on Twitter.
5) MENTIONED IN, USER to TWEET: user men-
tioned in tweet (with reference to @ handle)
3http://neo4j.com/
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Figure 1. Social network and connectivity visualization of at-risk users based on conversations containing risk words (extracted from Neo4J). Left:
overall risk-tagged conversations. Right: conversations tagged with terms suggesting male-male sexual behaviors (MSM). Clusters of users who engage in
risk-tagged conversations clearly appear in both graphs. The MSM-tagged conversation also shows interesting cross-clusters connections.
6) HAS HASHTAG, TWEET to HASHTAG: tweet con-
tains listed hashtag (#).
7) HAS URL, TWEET to URL: URL included in a
tweet.
8) HAS RISK WORD, TWEET to ONTOL-
OGY INSTANCE: risk word assigned to tweet
(can be multiple).
9) INSTANCE OF, ONTOLOGY INSTANCE to ON-
TOLOGY BUCKET: bucket the risk word belongs to.
We used this network-based information along with the
text based information to help analyze HIV risk from both
a single user and a network or community perspective.
For instance, one could identify “hubs” or “influencers”
from the network, based on the several different types of
social relationships described above, or similarity in HIV
riskiness between two users who share a connection. Graph-
ical representation of the risk-network in terms of social
network relationships could therefore offer significant added
value. We will expand on the possibilities for prevention and
interventions that these data yield in the next section.
III. DATA-DRIVEN PREVENTION OPPORTUNITIES
One of the key motivators of our research is answering the
question “Can Twitter’s network data be used as a tool to
infer the social network of individuals that are at high risk of
acquisition or transmission of HIV?” and then intervene in
the real world to try and decrease the risk of these individuals
and groups. Our computational infrastructure and network
model allow us to explore types of social relationships on
Twitter that could possibly be good indicators of real life
user-user connections. In particular, we decided to explore
the following four types of social relationships derived from
our HIV risk network that seem to indicate strong user-
user connections. In turn, one or more of these relationships
could potentially be good indicators of real world contact
and therefore real risk and enable us to extract risk-networks
in a more reliable way:
1) Conversations: Connections between users that en-
gaged in HIV at-risk conversations with one another
via exchanging tweets. Every pair of users that en-
gages in a direct exchange of tweets tagged with risk
words is said to be part of “risk-tagged conversa-
tions”. We can derive additional attributes for each
conversation, such as frequency, average length, risk
category, type of conversation chain, etc.
2) Geographic + Temporal Co-location: Connec-
tions between users that were co-present in a spa-
tial+temporal sense. Every pair of users that were
within 1 mile apart from one another in a time window
of 1 hour are said to have been geographically and
temporally co-present.
3) Mentions: Connections between Twitter users who
“mention” (using the “@” sign) another individual in
a tweet as a mechanism to directly address that tweet
to the mentioned individual.
4) Follows: Connections between users who “follow”
other individuals as a mechanism for the followers to
consume content generated by the followees.
While it is still unclear to what extent these four social
relationships should be exploited for effective prevention
efforts, it is possible to start exploring the risk network by
looking at those social networks graphically. Figure 1 shows
an example of an extract of conversations related to HIV-
risk overall, and specifically in the setting of one of our risk
category (conversations tagged with MSM sexual behavior).
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Besides the overview visualization shown in Fig. 1, it is
also possible to investigate those clusters in details and try to
better understand the characteristics of those conversations.
Figure 2 shows such an example, where different kinds
of relationships can be seen, namely a hybrid substance
abuse-MSM risk hub, a smaller substance abuse hub, a
bidirectional, and two uni-directional conversation patterns.
Figure 2. Zoomed View: Graph Visualization of Conversations within the
HIV Risk Network. The green nodes indicate the user nodes identified by
a system-generated identifier to protect the user’s anonymity. The edges
between these nodes indicated conversations, color-coded and labeled with
the risk category that the conversation belongs to.
The advantage of our native network model, allows us
to explore the data at finer levels of granularity. Besides
the risk category, conversations networks can be easily
extracted and visualized based on the frequency of the
conversation between two users, on the average length of
these conversations, and so on.
Another interesting way to look at the HIV tweets contain-
ing risk words, as well as their authors, is the geographical
point of view. Every tweet in our continuously updating
corpus is geo-tagged, meaning that we know exactly where
it originated. This allows us to infer higher or lower presence
of tweets with risk words on the territory. Figure 3 illustrates
an example of how the density of tweets containing risk
words can be overlayed on a map and can indicate potential
areas that are more at risk than others. Interestingly, while
some of these areas might be well-known to be at risk, others
emerged as new potential, and unknown, risk areas.
The geographical information can also be exploited in
combination with our network model to investigate co-
location. Establishing co-location from an individual’s social
footprint can be of particular help to draw more direct
connections from users social connections to their real world
connections. These links can also help further characterize
potential risk-venues that emerged from the geographic-only
visualization. Figure 4 shows the graph visualization of user-
user connections based on co-location derived using Neo4J.
We can observe that several clusters are interspersed within
this network and how the nature of this network differs from
that observed in the conversations network.
Figure 3. Heatmap showing the geo-location of all tweets containing
risk words in San Diego county from January 2016 to June 2016. Big
clusters such as downtown San Diego, Hillcrest and Northpark (the big blob
and smaller blob in the center) and the border region (at the bottom) are
well known. Other spots in north and east county (e.g. Poway/Encinitas,
Oceanside and Julian) emerge as new potential risk areas, not typically
considered by preventative campaigns.
Finally, Twitter is also characterized by two additional
more explicit networking information, mentions and follow-
ing, which are both actively defined by users. Once again,
our model and infrastructure allows us to explore these
relationships as shown in Fig. 5 and 6.
Since users tend to follow those whom they either connect
with in real life or whose opinions resonate with their
own [14], [15], the follower/followees sub-network within
the HIV risk network (Fig. 5) can provide useful cues
towards understanding real-world user connections and pre-
vention opportunities in terms of highly-connected networks.
Twitter also allows a user to directly address other users
via tweets using their Twitter handles (e.g. “@alice Let’s
party tonight!’ is a way to address this tweet directly to
Alice). Social relationships based on user mentions such
as the one shown in Fig. 6, could be another indicator
of real world user-user connections since they indicate an
alternative communication strategy across users.
Figure 4. Co-location network visualization extract. Each purple node
here represents a user, identified by a system generated integer to protect
the anonymity of the users. The edges represent the “colocation with”
connections.
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Figure 5. Following relationships in the HIV at-risk network. Every
node in this graph visualization stands for a user in the HIV risk network.
“FOLLOWS” directed edges join every pair of users where one of them
follows the other. While the previous networks mostly showed disjoint
clusters, this network highlights an interestingly unique form of clusters
where most of the dense clusters are interconnected amongst themselves.
IV. REFLECTING ON ETHICS FOR HIV RISK ON TWITTER
Social network analysis and ethical dilemmas have been
a vivid forum of discussions since the inception of the
field of sociometric research [16] and then social network
analysis [17]. Benefits and risks have been discussed by
researchers and institutional review boards for years, and the
impact of online social media was investigated already in the
mid-1990s [18]. In discussing the ethics of social network
analysis, benefits are typically abstracted from individuals to
the level of society or humanity (i.e. “how many lives can
be saved”) which is often used as the rationale for most of
this research.
However, the relative balance of individual risk (related to
loss of privacy) and public health benefit (related to use of
network transmission data to guide public health strategies)
remains a subject of discussion and debate among experts
in the field. Already in 2005, Kadushin highlighted two
Figure 6. Mentions network as a subset of the HIV at-risk network.
“MENTIONS” edges join every pair of HIV at-risk users where one of them
mentions the other. Each of these edges is also characterized by a mentioned
‘frequency’ property. Edges are directed, the source node representing the
user mentioning the target user.
important ethical issues that arise when investigating social
relationships [19], i.e. the level of accuracy that should be
provided so that reliable results can be presented (either at
the individual level or as a community), and considerations
around the results of social network analysis being subject to
judicial review. Hoser and Nitschke additionally discussed
how privacy issues and the increasing awareness on privacy,
are critical in a connected world, but also how this is
difficult when users themselves “give away” their data for
free [20]. Eysenbach and Till stressed how the ethical issues
are different if data is made available within a private vs.
a public sphere, especially when connected to clinical or
biomedical research [21].
Nowadays, after 10–15 years, we still face the same is-
sues, but with massive amount of data and more capabilities
to analyze these data and make inferences about them.
Social media platforms make it easier to collect these data,
and the existing APIs allow researchers (like us) to start
exploiting these incredible data. In this section we would like
to reconsider the dilemmas that researchers investigated in
previous years, specifically highlighting and discussing the
ethical dimension arising from our Twitter-based research
on PIRC-Net. As mentioned above, the development of our
platform, the data collection strategies, the storage of the col-
lected data, our analyses, and finally our inferences onto the
HIV/AIDS vulnerable populations all raised critical ethical
concerns that need to be taken into serious consideration and
need to be evaluated against the benefits of this research in
terms of improved preventative efforts based on data-driven
approaches. We do so here by analyzing our research in a
structured way, looking at the ethics of data collection and
analysis first, then discussing model-based inferences, and
finally exploring ethics in prevention strategies.
A. Ethics of Data Collection and Analyses on Twitter
The initial effort in our research, and also the first step
of our computational platform, focused on collecting geo-
tagged data from Twitter through the available Twitter APIs.
This step was then followed by our filtering process aimed at
limiting our analyses to a corpus of tweets containing HIV
risk words with a low probability of false positives.
1) Retrieving and Storing Publicly Available Data: The
first ethical question that we encountered was directly related
to the collection and storage of the data from Twitter. Given
that we are only accessing publicly available Tweets that the
users shared online and made accessible to everyone, our
assumption was that the retrieval and local storage of this
data posed no particular risks. However, a short exchange
with our university’s human subject protection office (or
IRB) highlighted several potential risks. The IRB stated how
it was necessary to “Provide a more thorough analysis of
the potential risks” and how “additional risks to users such
as reputational and social risks should be outlined, as very
sensitive material is being collected and analyzed”.
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While it is clear that we are working with a vulnerable
population, it is not clear why the tweets shared by the users
need to be considered very sensitive, and what additional
reputational and social risk would be created in the process
of collecting this data. As our work demonstrated, we were
able to find many tweets exposing at-risk behavior (i.e.
MSM sexual practices) that users choose to share online.
Papacharissi and her colleagues remind us that people who
decide to broadcast on a public forum like Twitter, did not
necessarily think about their tweets being readily available
for anybody to analyze and scrutinize [22]. Is this enough
to warrant the enforcement of additional measures to collect
and store the data in a more ethical manner, even if analysis
of the data is conducted in an anonymized and aggregate
way? We believe that this is heavily context-dependent and
we need flexible guidelines on how to operate in this setting.
2) Anonymization and Privacy Procedures: During anal-
ysis of the tweets, depending on their content, we assigned a
particular HIV risk value to single tweets and automatically
also to their authors, making this information available to our
research team. While anonymization of the author, as well
as any other identifiable user information (such as mentions)
is an important steps to warrant protection to the users, are
other information of this tagged tweets to be masked?
IRB policy was to further anonymize the tweets and stripe
them of any information that would allow “quoted text
to expose private information through public channels that
can be searched for”. This meant to transform the tweets
by applying specific ‘Name Entity Recognition’ Natural
Language Processing filters, such as the one implemented
by MITRE,4 to attempt to remove Personally Identifiable
Information (PII). Additionally, in an effort to limit content
reconstruction and linkage to the original users who posted
the message, we removed stop words and punctuation from
tweets, uniformed them to a lowercase form, and applied
stem words reduction techniques. The resulting tweets were
not linked to the original ones, but it was also not possible
to understand their meaning anymore, making any further
analysis on the tweets impossible.
3) Crowd-Sourcing and Expert-Sourcing: In order to ob-
tain a labeled data-set, we initially planned to crowdsource
the task on a mechanical turk platform5 where turkers would
manually assign labels to the tweets based on their percep-
tion of the tweet’s HIV risk. Our ethical protocol mandated
that the anonymization policy outlined above would have to
be enforced in order to share the tweets through an online
platform like mechanical turk. However, the aggressive de-
identification of their content made turkers unable to un-
derstand the tweets and therefore to perform their labeling.
Given that tweets are already in the public domain, we
wonder to what extent this is necessary and what alternative
4http://mist-deid.sourceforge.net
5http://www.mturk.com
could have been proposed? Perhaps framing the turker
questions in a way that was not leading to inferences about
HIV/AIDS would have been sufficient? In our case given the
strict management of privacy/anonymization we instead re-
cruited local domain expert to conduct a small scale labeling
experiment on site, under our supervision. We judged that in
this controlled situation aggressive anonymization policies
were not necessary, so tweets were only removed of any
direct identifier (author and mentions).
4) Judicial Review of Illegal Risk Behaviors: Given the
inherent search for HIV risk behaviors, our research is
predisposed to uncover behaviors that might also be illegal,
especially in terms of substance abuse terms. Although this
was not our goal and none of the analysis algorithms we
developed tried to uncover illegal risk behaviors, tweets
mentioning distribution of illicit drugs emerged in an anony-
mous way during our labeling and review activities. For
instance a tweet described a neighbor’s use of marijuana
and methamphetapine in the courtyard, while another user,
a possible drug dealer, tweeted to his followers to direct
message him/her if they wanted to buy methamphetamine.
Ethical guidelines typically state that researchers have no
legal guarantee of confidentiality in the matter of illegal
behavior. Unless a certificate of confidentiality is obtained,
if a researcher collects information about illegal activities,
the researcher’s data may typically be subpoenaed by the
authorities. On the other side, researchers have no legal
obligation to report these cases, especially if the presence of
this data in their corpus might not be obvious. In addition,
the data we are considering here are in the public domain, so
what does subpoening these data really mean in this case?
Since these data are collected in big quantities, they are
mostly analyzed by machine learning through an automatic
computational infrastructure that anonymized the data as part
of the process, so that behaviors that could have criminal jus-
tice consequences are not linked to the anonymous Twitter
users. On the other side, the flagging of this information
could be designed into the algorithms which could then
extract and classify illegal behavior, similarly as we are
classifying at-risk HIV behavior. We wonder to what extent
this needs to be regulated and what is the most appropriate
ethical framework to apply here? We believe that legal
regulations have not been updated to reflect changing com-
munication practices and available social media platforms,
and must begin to take into account public available data.
B. Ethics of Model-driven inferences
Our work on PIRC-Net is based on data that is publicly
made available through Twitter for reasons different than
being classified for HIV at-risk behavior. Inherently this
data is inaccurate and the inferences that we are making
about the authors and their social networks are based
on an artificial model that we built and tested on this
data. Although this model might actually be effective,
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we believe that we should always be cautious in the
way we present potentially inaccurate results. Let us look
at three assumptions that lead to three different inaccuracies.
1) Incomplete Data: Our strategies for collecting data are
incomplete and inaccurate already in their design. In order
to inform local intervention strategies, we only consider data
from San Diego County. This means putting a filter on the
Twitter API that will only deliver data that has been geo-
tagged with a location within those boundaries. However,
research has shown that only less than 1.6% of the tweets
from Twitter sample hose are geotagged [23]. Additionally,
while we filter for verified Twitter accounts to discern
between organizations and individuals who are posting the
tweets, this assumes that all organizations actually registered
and verified their account with Twitter.
2) Text-based Analysis Strategies: The text-based filter-
ing technique that is at the basis of our approach is grounded
into an algorithm matching a set of key words manually
defined to represent our five risk buckets, to the content of
the single tweets. While this intuitively makes sense, the
generation of this word list is a key component that can
influence the resulting classification. In our case this has
been defined by our clinical and domain experts, but it is
hard to understand how universal these terms are. While
we are planning to continuously updating the risk word list,
the specific background and demographics of the domain
experts contributing to populate this risk word list, as well
as the different language slangs that are used in the local
community critically influence the resulting filtered data.
3) Probabilistic Filters and Machine-Learning:
Similarly as described above, our application of machine
learning is based on manually labeled data. We demonstrated
the effectiveness of our approach in reducing false positives,
but this is still based on a relative small number of input
tweets and a group of domain experts who might introduce
specific cultural, language or demographic biases. The
resulting filters are probabilistic and it is very hard to say
how these results reflect reality in an accurate way.
Incomplete data, manually driven analyses, and proba-
bilistic data filtering are approaches that only approximate
the characterization of at-risk networks. While this rep-
resents an important advancement towards a data-driven
approach, we must always keep these limitations in mind
when we make inferences on specific users or communities.
We believe that these methods could be useful to better
understand and characterize networks of people at risk
for HIV infection, however it is not clear what ethical
framework needs to be used to frame these results in a way
that does not over-interpret them.
C. Ethics of Data-driven interventions
This project unequivocally showed potential new path-
ways to drive interventions in the real world based on
real-time collection of data on social media. While this
is exciting, we need to reflect on how to further exploit
this information, and which of the possible approaches
presented earlier in Section III is ethically acceptable. In
particular we would like the research community to reflect
on the real linkage between social media and real world
in the setting of HIV risk and prevention, on the meaning
of geographically-based and network-based interventions,
on the differences in addressing individuals vs. groups at
risk of HIV infection, and on the opportunity to exploit
emerging hubs and influencers in the network as vehicles
for prevention.
1) Social Media vs. Real World: Our analysis of social
networks and their potential for intervention is based on
the assumption that we can reflect social media links to
the real world. While this has been demonstrated on very
specific behaviors in other settings [24], [25], it is unclear
to what extent we can establish a clear relationship between
online at-risk communication and real-world risk. If this
relationship is not clear, how should we act on its inferences?
Is it ethically appropriate to build an intervention around
weak signals based on only approximate models? If we
reflect on how prevention campaigns are developed right
now, we realize that they are mostly based on partial views
of the world and intuition. Is it acceptable to follow the same
approach for social-media driven interventions?
2) Geo-based Interventions: The availability of geo-
graphical information that are stored with the tweet we
collected through PIRC-Net, opens up opportunities to in-
tervene in specific locations on the territory. What does
this mean for the people living in those areas, especially
when we uncover a new location? Is it acceptable to tag a
location as being potentially at higher risk of HIV to increase
the possibilities to reach individuals who happen to be in
that region when tweeting about at-risk behavior? Can we
intervene in specific venues (e.g. bars, restaurants), and what
is the right way to do it?
3) Network-based Interventions: Similarly as for the ge-
ographical localization, our tools allow us to uncover new
structures in the social fabric of the Twitter users who
tweeted about HIV risk behavior. To what extent it is
acceptable to reach out to those social networks, and what is
the ethically correct way to do that? Should we collectively
address high-risk networks as a whole? Should we identify
single users and reach out to them? Moreover, how subtle
should our message be? Is it ethically correct to make it evi-
dent that we have identified some behavioral patterns that are
indicative of HIV risk in this specific network? Or should we
use a higher-level, general strategy that although specifically
targeted, might appear unrelated to the surrounding network?
4) Hubs and Influencers: From our initial explorations,
it is apparent that the more data we collect, the more
social structures appear in our PIRC-Net networks. Hubs
and influencers (i.e. individuals central to the social network,
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typically followed by many other users) are emerging as
links for specific networks, or as a way to bridge between
different networks. Intuitively we would like to exploit
these important nodes within the network to spread our
interventions. However, should we really try to do this? How
can we approach these critical individuals or organizations in
an ethically correct way, without pointing fingers or having
a big brother effect? What is the approach that maximizes
protection and respect of the participants on one side, and
the chances of a successful intervention on the other side?
V. DISCUSSION
The development and deployment of our PIRC-Net in-
frastructure, allowed us to identify and highlight ethical
dilemmas of research to characterize HIV at-risk behaviors
on Twitter. Admittedly, we have raised more questions than
we provided answers, but this is intentional. We feel that
we are still defining and experimenting with the correct
ethical framework for social-media based big-data research,
especially when vulnerable and complex populations such
as HIV at risk individuals are at stake. Additionally, the
application of machine learning approaches and social net-
work analysis that is enabling researchers to create partial
inferences on the real world behavior of individuals and
groups, further complicates things. This approach might
have different impact if used to characterize a population, or
to drive public health intervention or campaigns, and we feel
that more experiments and more data need to be collected
on the ethical dilemmas around those different goals.
We see our work in this paper as a way to continue the
discussion that is developing on defining ethical frameworks
for social media research with vulnerable population. We
hope to be able to continue these reflections and propose
concrete guidance in the near future based on our experi-
ences in social media research around HIV risk, especially
by comparing and contrasting those experiences with the
recent increasing number of attempts to define guidelines
(ethical and beyond) for social media research. For instance
we are looking at how to integrate our observations in
the guidelines that Rivers and Lewis created for Twitter
studies [26]. Those guidelines build on six different points:
1) Study designs using Twitter-derived data should be
transparent and readily available to the public
2) The context in which a tweet is sent should be
respected by researchers
3) All data that could be used to identify tweet authors,
including geolocations, should be secured
4) No information from Twitter should be used to procure
more data about tweet authors from other sources
5) Study designs that require data collection from a
few individuals rather than aggregate analysis require
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
6) Researchers should adhere to a users attempt to control
his or her data by respecting privacy settings
Although this is certainly an interesting framework, it is
hardly universal. Some of the guidelines make a lot of sense
(i.e. #3 and #6), and are general enough to be applied widely.
However, we feel that most of them represent a big hurdle for
the research we presented here. For instance, ‘making study
designs available to the public’ (#1) is hard if we are working
on a collective risk radar. It is not feasible to publicly
advertise the study in the hopes that those people that we are
actually anonymously studying happened to read about it.
Just making the general public aware of the research does not
ensure targeting the right people. Furthermore, ‘respecting
the context of a tweet’ (#2) would preclude making any
inference about the content of the tweet (e.g. the HIV risk
of the behavior represented by the tweet), as well as other
possible questions on the collective behavior, making any
real research that goes beyond simple textual analysis very
hard. Moreover, ‘not collecting additional data about the
authors of a tweet’ (#4) implies that we should not explore
their social connections. Defining a priori that a study will
require IRB approval if data collection is specific around
few individuals rather than based on aggregate analysis (#5)
can be challenging as researchers might discover only after
having collected and analyzed large datasets that there are
actually important aspects to consider related to specific
individuals or groups. Based on the current regulations this
would mean that the large datasets that researchers already
collected would not be usable for these additional analyses.
More recently, Vitak and colleagues [27] reported on
their analysis which surveyed 263 online data researchers,
investigating their beliefs and practices around ethics and
privacy in their own research. What their analysis made
apparent is that while researchers in general try to aspire to
the ethical principles that are at the basis of human subjects
research, such as the Belmont Report [28], their practices are
much more nuanced and do not fit easily in this static and
rigorous framework. We believe that this is potentially due
to the varying nature of the research methods, and questions
that single research projects and specific investigators are
exploring. The ethics heuristics approach that they proposed
seems to scale better than other models, especially as a
support of the current explorations, however our project
shows that sometimes it is not clear how to effectively
address some of these heuristics. For instance, Transparency
is hard to address when it is not clear if and how one should
reach out to specific subsets of the analyzed network
As an alternative, Hutton and Anderson [29] present
an architecture for ethical and privacy-sensitive social net-
work experiments. They propose to automatically implement
ethics and privacy policies as part of their computational
infrastructure. This seems like the right way to apply ethics
at a system level; yet it is unclear how those ethics policies
are defined and it is difficult to see how these should be
implemented as part of a computational system. We believe
that taking their approach further would enable many of
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these computational systems, including PIRC-Net to exploit
an integrated infrastructure. Potentially this approach could
be merged with a more nuanced ethics policies as proposed
by Vitak et al. to enable a more flexible and adaptable
framework, which could suit the expanding landscape of
social media studies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Developing effective ethical practices for big-data social-
media research is hard. Despite the initial attempts to define
unique frameworks, it seems that a “one size fits all” does
not really work. This is particularly apparent when we
approach the research from a different point of view such
as informing prevention efforts for vulnerable population
through analysis of social media interactions. In this paper
we showed how the development and deployment of our
PIRC-Net infrastructure allowed us to inform the practice
of prevention based on HIV risk on Twitter, and how
this opens up a number of interesting approaches to better
serve the community and potentially help controlling the
HIV/AIDS epidemics. Our focus has exposed the ethical
dilemmas that these opportunities bring along, and how these
complex socio-technical problems have no easy solution.
We believe that our continuing experience in this setting
will provide more guidance towards extending heuristic-
centered approaches into more agile and easily tailored ways
to protect human subjects, while preserving the ability of
researchers to effectively support public health efforts.
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